اين قفس برگير تا اين يک نفس باقيست.

آن هنگام که مه از کوه نقاشی تو فرو ريخت،

من زنده بودم، سرمست از آن هنگام.

ای پناهنده،

فرار کن.

به گوشه تخت

برای گريستن.

ويرانی می ريزد،

فرار کن.

کافيست.

بايست.

نيمه شب است و راه گشوده،

بنگر.

ويرانی می ريزد.

قلم بايست.

اميدهای کهنه را ننويس دگر.

تو برو.

چه می دانستی فرار بايد کرد.

سحر دميد.

چشمانت را ببند.

به آرزويش خوابيدی،

سحر تنها بيدارت کرد.

آن هنگامی که فرو می افتادم

تو ريسمانی بودی آويزان از آسمان آبی.

چنگ زدم، نه به اميد نيفتادن

تو را آرزو داشتم.

برای ما يکسان است چه زاری و بی تابی کنيم و چه شکيبايی ورزيم، گريزگاهی نداريم. (قرآن، ابراهيم ۲۱)

S is defined in terms of causal connections between inputs and outputs of those sub-systems in the context of various possible combinations of states of other sub-systems of A, i.e. other concurrently active functional states, as well as causal connections with S’s own changing sub-states.

Each sub-state S is defined by its causal relationships to other sub-states (and therefore to the sub-systems that produce them) and, in some cases, its causal relations to the environment.

Individual A has several coexisting, independently varying, interacting mental states. Each sub-state S of A will typically depend in part on some sub-mechanism or sub-system in A which produces it.

An entity A can have only one, indivisible, mental state at a time, and each state is completely characterized by its role in a state-transition network in which current input to A plus current state of A determine the immediately following output of A and next state of A.

The nature of a mental state is just like the nature of an automaton state: constituted by its relations to other states and to inputs and outputs; a disposition in behavior.

اين صبر تو را خواهد کشت

برو.

 All biological information processing is based and realized in physical mechanisms. But that does not imply that information processing states and processes are physical states and processes in the sense of being best described using the concepts of the physical sciences (physics, chemistry, astronomy, etc.).

• The language of physics (mainly equations) is not as well suited for describing consciousness as the languages of logic, discrete mathematics, formal linguistics (grammars of various kinds) and the languages of computer scientists, software engineers and AI theorists.

•        We can enhance our understanding of consciousness by designing, building, analyzing, and experimenting with virtual-machine architectures. This process will lead to gradual refinement and extensions of many of our pre-theoretical concepts of mind to “architecture based” concepts.

In this “short description” series I’ll try to explain the following about consciousness in the “Virtual Machine Functionalism” framework, according to the cogAff  project:

•        What theory?

Theories that will help us see the data needed and the involved entities to come up with a model.

•        What language?

A language for both describing the data and the model

•        What model?

The framework that puts all the data, entities and the casual relation between them in one consistent picture.

غم به صورتم می کوبد،

از درون.

و هر  فشار با سياهی موهای صورت

بيرون می چربد.

صابونم کو؟

زمانه ساکتی است،

همه چيز زبانی دارد.

دنيايی که در آن می زيم

نقاشی های آويخته به ديوار دارد

غروری مهربان

و موزيک پنهان،

آماده به ضرب.

متشخص، نيرومند،

رقصان.

صدايش می کنم.

خواندم و شنيدی

زمانی بود از جنس نزديکی

Four days ago, on the bike trail to work, I tried to see the road in a way that you would like it. Days after that, I saw marks of the places where I missed you, over and over and …

They say a poem is untranslatable; well that’s too bad then, because you’d have to write your poems in English: everything must be translatable to English.